Desertion, identity, and the North American squadron 1784-1812

The North American squadron prior to the War of 1812

After the end of the War of American Independence in 1783, the size of the North American squadron was significantly reduced in both numbers of vessels and men, as it returned to its normal headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Between 1783 and the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War in 1793, the establishment at the Halifax dockyard was designed to support only one 50-gun flagship, four small frigates, two sloops and a brig, and at times there were even fewer warships available than this. The duties of these vessels were predominantly reduced to trade enforcement and protection of the George's Bank and the Gulf of St Lawrence fisheries from American and other interlopers.

After the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793, the station gradually increased in size, but prior to 1812 it would not regain the heights of its former complement of men and ships reached during the War of Independence. This was primarily because the British Navy followed the so-called Western squadron strategy, whereby most of its ships remained in home waters in a centre of gravity used to counter both possible French invasion or other major French fleet movements, rather than deploying large squadrons permanently on overseas stations. The problem of desertion, however, regardless of the size of the North American station, remained equally vexing to its commander-in-chief and senior officers.

This was particularly the case after the Great Mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797, the Irish Rebellion of 1798, and through the last years of the eighteenth century and the turn of the nineteenth. This was a period of growing tensions between the United States and British governments over trade disputes, neutral rights in merchant shipping during the wars with France, and the continued impressment of American merchant seamen by British naval vessels around the world.

The tensions over desertion and impressment would culminate in two major naval incidents which nearly brought the United States and Great Britain to war in 1807. These were the encounters between HMS Leopard and the USS Cheasapeake, and subsequently the tit for tat engagement between HMS Little Belt and the USS President. It is the former that is of most interest here, as both the Leopard frigate and the Halifax sloop are in the 1806-7 ship sample, and deserters from the latter and the actions of the former were at the centre of the incident. In June 1807, much of the North American squadron was deployed in Cheasapeake Bay, off the Susquehanna, York and Potomac rivers, or off the capes of Delaware Bay, enforcing trade regulations concerning neutral American shipping and searching for French frigates rumoured to be operating along the eastern seaboard of the United States.

HM Sloop Halifax (18) had lost several men to desertion in the Cheasapeake Bay region, and when the Leopard sent boats ashore at Norfolk, Virginia to replenish her water and stores, some of her officers encountered and recognized the men, signing up to serve in the United States Navy at a Rendezvous established by the officers of the Cheasapeake, which was fitting out there. After a heated exchange between the men and the two groups of officers, the men refused to return to the Leopard, the American officers refusing to take any action to return them as was requested. The British reported the incident to the station commander in Halifax, Vice Admiral George Cranfield Berkeley. Berkeley was infuriated that British seamen would desert to the United States Navy, and then flaunt their new allegiance in such an open and insulting manner. He immediately issued orders to all ships on the North American station to stop and search any American vessel, including warships, which captains had reason to believe were harbouring British deserters.

On the 22nd of June 1807, the Leopard encountered the Cheasapeake at sea while on a cruise. Accounts of the event vary¹, but according to theLeopard's log after exchanging signals with Berkeley's flagship, the Bellona, the Leopard entered Cheasapeake Bay at 6am. By 9:30am she had theCheasapeake in sight, and bore down on the American frigate by 3:27pm. TheLeopard then hailed her American counterpart at least once, and sent an officer aboard her with a demand that the Cheasapeake heave to to be searched for the deserters. The Americans, considering such a search of a warship in contravention of international law, refused to comply. The log describes the events which followed:

At 4.21 the boat returned from the Cheasapeake with an Answer to Dispatches, After reading which the Captain repeatedly hailed (saying) he was under the Necessity of Enforcing His Orders (To which no Attention was paid). At 4.30 fired a Gun across her forefoot & again hailed her without effect. At 4.34 Cape Henry Lighthouse then bearing NW B N 4 or 5 Leagues. Commenced firing on the Frigate Cheasapeake – after three broadsides which were returned by a few Guns. At 4.45 she Struck her Colours & sent her first Lieutenant on board the Leopard.²

The Cheasapeake, on a shakedown cruise and without a fully trained crew or time to beat to quarters and prepare her guns for action, was unable to stand up to such punishment and was forced to surrender. A search was conducted, and four men, deserters from the British warships Halifax andMelampus, were removed by force from the American vessel. The officers conducting the search suspected that many other runaways were also aboard.

The four men, William Ware, Daniel Martin and John Strachan of theMelampus, and Jenkin Ratford of the Halifax, were court-martialed. Ratford's trial occurred on board HMS Belleisle in Halifax Harbour on 26 August 1807, and was presided over by Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane. Cochrane, the commander of the Leeward Islands station, was in Halifax refitting some of his ships at the yard. Thus, under naval regulations, he presided over courts martial as the second senior officer present in the port. Ratford was sentenced to death and hung from the yardarm of the Halifax sloop. The other three seamen were tried on board HMS Bellona on 8 September 1807, again with Cochrane presiding over the court of naval officers. Ware and his companions were also found guilty of desertion, "...but in consideration of former good conduct and high character given them by their officers as well as contrition shown for their offences..." they were sentenced to receive "only" 500 lashes each, and to be flogged around the fleet at Halifax. The action by the Leopardbecame a major international incident, with some on both sides, (at least among the naval officers in North America) willing and apparently eager to go to war. Reinforcements were rushed to the North American station, while the United States government considered what preparations could be made for a war with Great Britain amidst wide public outrage.

The British government, engaged in a global war with Napoleonic France and with its financial and military resources stretched, had little desire to begin another conflict across the Atlantic in North America. Meanwhile, the hawks among American politicians realised that their country was perhaps not quite as prepared in terms of material resources (or eager, at least in the northeastern United States, where a profitable merchant trade was flourishing with British North America) to go to war with Britain and her remaining North American colonies. After much diplomacy, tensions eased, and an infuriated Admiralty Board recalled Berkeley to London, replacing him with Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren on 15 October 1807. Warren took over command on Berkeley's departure from Bermuda on 27 February 1808. Warren himself was replaced as station commander by Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer on 26 November 1810, taking over command on Warren's departure on 21 January 1811. Sawyer would remain in Halifax until Warren's return after the start of the War of 1812. Meanwhile, on the 16 May 1811 another incident involving HMSLittle Belt, during which the much more powerful USS President opened fire on the smaller sloop without any warning, heightened naval tensions to even greater levels, and foreshadowed the coming conflict.

Throughout this period the numbers of American and Irish seamen on board British warships in North American waters were a matter of concern among many British naval officers in North America. There was much open sympathy between the two nationalities, given the large Irish-American population, and shared republican ideals. Between 1797 and 1799 there was much "ethnic panic" in both Halifax and St. John's over potential unrest by Irish seamen, who were often suspected of being members of the United Irishmen movement, but little came of these fears. Authorities in Halifax were greatly concerned over the possible threat to the Halifax yard, the only British naval facility in North America, which was perceived to be at risk when several deliberately set fires occurred in 1798 and 1799. Steps were taken to “...clear the town of a great number of the prisoners in it...” as many of them were suspected of Irish political connections. The events were later revealed as the apolitical acts of a solitary local lunatic, although it took until 1802 for this to be fully proved.³

From the turn of the nineteenth century onwards and following the union of Ireland and Great Britain in 1801, several ships in North America experienced violent mutinies and mass desertions of seamen and marines, often led by American or Irish seamen, and other seamen not from the metropolitan British Isles. These included the Jason, Vesta, and Columbine mutinies between 1807 and 1809, and there was unrest on other vessels, including the flagship of the squadron, HMS Bellona.

For the 1806-07 sample, six vessels of different rates, ranging in size from the Vesta schooner to the 74-gun squadron flagship HMS Bellona, have been analysed, using the same random sampling method for the earlier 1775-6 sample.

Desertion rates, 1806-7 ship sample

For the 1806-07 sample, Table 1 shows that in raw numbers over 500 men, or around sixteen percent of the 3,216 men on the books of the six vessels examined to date deserted. Individual ships had raw desertion numbers ranging from nine to forty percent of the men on their books, but as we can see here all were below twenty percent with the exception of the Vestaand the Columbine . Deserters per annum as a percent of average complement varied from around six to almost thirty-six percent, while turnover from all causes, such as normal discharges of men to other vessels as well as men discharged for sickness, death, and disability, ranged from twenty-two to sixty-five percent. There does not appear to be as strong a correlation here between turnover rates and desertion as in the earlier ship sample - for example, several ships had turnover rates similar to that of the Columbine, but did not experience as high desertion rates or a mass desertion mutiny.

Table 1 - Desertion rates, 1806-7 sample